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Using data on 451 Chinese privatizations over the period 1994-2002, this paper empirically 
investigates the firm and stock market characteristics that determine the size of the portion of 
new shares sold to the general public and underpricing at SIP-time.  We find that poor 
performance and financing constraints, reflected by a low profitability and high leverage, mainly 
drive public share allocation.  Also, the government widens ownership to a larger extent in firms 
that receive substantial subsidies.  By contrast, stock market returns pre-SIP and variables 
capturing the firm’s growth opportunities do not positively affect public share allocation.  Yet, in 
firms with a low market-to-book ratio, the government is more likely to relinquish its majority 
stake at SIP-time.  The determinants of underpricing further illustrate the uniqueness of SIPs 
compared to private-firm IPOs.  Overall, there is little evidence that information asymmetries 
regarding firm value influence first-day returns whereas stock market conditions have an impact.  
After accounting for the endogeneity of the public share allocation decision, we find that the 
fraction of ownership divested is significantly positively related to underpricing. 
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1. Introduction 
Ever since Britain’s Thatcher government launched a large-scale privatization program in the 
early 1980s, privatization has expanded across developed as well as developing countries.   
According to Megginson and Netter (2001), by the end of 1999, the cumulative proceeds raised 
by privatizing governments worldwide has exceeded 1 trillion US dollars and 12 out of the 15 
largest IPOs ever conducted were privatization IPOs (PIPOs).  In addition, Kikeri and Kolo 
(2005) document that during the last decade especially developing countries have initiated 
massive privatizations; they find that over the period 1990-2003, the 120 developing countries in 
their sample implemented 7860 privatization transactions, which generated proceeds of nearly 
410 billion US dollars. 
This paper studies privatizations in China.  The importance of the Chinese economy in 
the world has become more visible with China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 2001 and its astounding economic growth rates in recent years.  China has become the second 
largest economy in the world on a purchasing power basis only after the US and is also the 
second largest FDI recipient country in the world (World Investment Report, 2005).  Under the 
policy of privatizing all but the largest and strategically important state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), privatization has had a significant impact on the Chinese economic landscape.  The first 
(partial) privatization occurred in 1984, when the government permitted a department store in 
Beijing to sell shares to its employees.  In 1990, 10 companies became listed through a share 
issuing privatization for the first time.  A share issuing privatization (SIP) is hereby defined as a 
public offering of common stock by a firm with government ownership (e.g., Dewenter and 
Malatesta, 1997; Jones et al., 1999).  This study focuses on initial SIPs, where firms are 
introduced on the domestic capital market rather than abroad.  In fact, the stock exchanges of  
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Shanghai and Shenzhen were established in 1990 and 1991, respectively to facilitate future SIPs.  
By the end of 2003, more than 1000 state-owned enterprises of middle and large size have been 
privatized, through listing some of their shares on these two national exchanges.  These firms 
represent about 93% of all publicly quoted firms in China.  This is not surprising as the first 
private-firm IPO took place only in 2000.  Besides, a lot of small firms have been sold off 
through private auctions.  As of 2000, China has emerged as the most important privatizing 
country, accounting for more than 20% of worldwide privatization proceeds (Kikeri and Kolo, 
2005).  Also, as the Chinese government plans to further privatize a large number of the 
remaining SOEs and divest some of its remaining stake in firms already publicly quoted, a study 
that examines privatizations in China likely is relevant and timely.
1
Given the importance of privatization, both in terms of number of firms involved and 
impact on the economy,
2 many studies have explored the macro-economic determinants 
underlying privatization across countries and its impact on the performance of newly privatized 
firms (e.g., Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987; Shleifer, 1998; Megginson et al., 1994; Boubakri and 
Cosset, 1998; Gupta, 2005).  Only a few recent articles have examined the event of privatization 
itself, investigating the determinants of the choice between different privatization methods (e.g., 
the decision to list SOEs abroad in Bortolotti et al. (2000) and the choice between SIP versus 
private auction in Megginson et al. (2004)) and the terms adopted by governments (Jones et al. 
(1999), for example, investigate how political and economic factors affect whether the 
 
1 In June 2005, for example, the Chinese government approved that 46 publicly quoted firms will be allowed to have 
their non-tradable shares circulating in the near future; this approval can be considered as an important move to pave 
the road for further sales of state shares within these firms. 
2 As an example, the state’s economic role in China declined dramatically from 80 percent of GDP in 1978 to only 
17 percent in 2003.  However, SOEs remain a dominant economic force, employing half of China’s 750 million 
workers, controlling 57% of its industrial assets and dominating key industries such as financial services, power, and 
telecommunications (McKinsey Quarterly, October 2004).  
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government favors one group of potential investors over another and underpricing).  Our paper 
fills this void by examining the firm and stock market variables that affect public share allocation 
and underpricing in SIPs, using firm-level data on 451 Chinese privatizations during 1994-2002.  
As we argue later on in this paper, an important feature of Chinese SIPs is that they are partial in 
nature and mainly involve the sale of primary, i.e. newly issued shares at SIP-time. 
Up till now, studies on the privatization process in China are limited in number as well as 
scope.  Actually, most studies examine underpricing in the Chinese domestic stock market.  Mok 
and Hui (1998), Chan et al. (2004), Chen et al. (2004) and Su (2004a, b) shed some light on the 
determinants of underpricing in Chinese IPOs, which in fact are SIPs.  They conclude that 
variables capturing information asymmetries have some influence on underpricing in the 
Chinese stock market.  Specifically, they find that firm age and size reduce whereas the time lag 
between share offering and listing increases first-day return.  By contrast, Su (2004a) finds that 
leverage increases underpricing in the Chinese stock market.  As far as the relation between 
ownership retained by the initial owner (the government) and underpricing is concerned, these 
studies find conflicting results.  Mok and Hui (1998) and Chan et al. (2004), for example, find 
that retained state ownership has a significantly negative impact whereas Chen et al. (2004) 
document a significantly positive relation with underpricing.  Also, while Mok and Hui (1998) 
and Chan et al. (2004) find the same sign, they interpret their results differently.  Our study 
examines underpricing in a more elaborated model based on the IPO literature, using a more 
clear definition of government ownership.  Also, our sample includes data on more recent 
transactions and takes the endogenous nature of public share allocation into account.
3
 
3 By contrast, Mok and Hui (1998) examine a sample of 87 A share IPOs during the period 1990-1993 whereas Chen 
et al. (2004) use data on 701 A share IPOs in 1992-1997 and Chan et al. (2004) cover 570 A share IPOs over 
1993-1998.  Finally, Su (2004a) studies 348 IPOs between 1994 and 1999 whereas Su (2004b) examines 587 IPOs  
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Only a few studies on Chinese SIPs have looked at the determinants of changes in 
government ownership, which essentially was a byproduct of their analysis.  Tian (2001) and 
Sun and Tong (2003), for example, examine the financial and operating performance changes of 
Chinese SOEs that are (partially) privatized through an SIP during 1994-1998 and thereby take 
into account that the decision to privatize may be related to the firm’s prior performance.  
Specifically, Tian regresses the change in government ownership at SIP-time on the firm’s ROA 
in the preceding year and industry dummy variables whereas Sun and Tong regress the 
proportion of state ownership upon public listing and the three-year average of this variable after 
SIP, respectively on the three-year average ROS before privatization, leverage, firm size and 
industry dummy variables.  While Sun and Tong find that the Chinese government retains more 
shares in larger, highly levered companies, both studies fail to find a significant relation between 
pre-SIP profitability and government divestment.  Also, the model fit in both studies is rather 
limited.  Specifically, the explanatory power of Tian’s (2001) model amounts to 14.5% whereas 
this percentage is only 2% in the study of Sun and Tong (2003). 
Overall, the literature up till now has considered the SIP decision process in China to be a 
black box, claiming that the selection of SOEs for listing is rarely based on economic merit, 
attractiveness to investors, or the need of capital (e.g., Wei et al., 2005).  Rather, these studies 
allege that the SIP decision process is highly politicized and driven by quota systems.  This study 
therefore investigates the determinants of public share allocation in a more elaborated model, 
starting from the main theories on going public.  Specifically, we examine the fraction of (new) 
shares sold to the general public at SIP-time.  As far as we know, there is no comparable 
empirical study in the privatization literature yet.  Our research, as a result, will also shed some 
 
between 1994 and 1999.  
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light on why the government chooses to privatize SOEs.  In addition, our findings may help to 
explain why SIPs in China so far are only of limited success, despite the country’s high economic 
growth.  Many studies indeed show that the financial and operating performance of SOEs in 
China deteriorates after their SIP (e.g., Sun and Tong, 2003; Quan and Huyghebaert, 2004).  
Furthermore, as of 2000, the Chinese domestic stock markets have endured a serious price fall, 
whereby more than half of the market capitalization was destroyed.  The results from this 
analysis allow us to subsequently examine in more detail the relation between changes in state 
ownership and underpricing.  As we argued before, the results on this relation are not consistent 
throughout the literature and different explanations have been offered.  Our study is the first to 
take the endogeneity of the public share allocation decision process into account when 
examining underpricing in Chinese SIPs. 
Using data on 451 Chinese privatizations over the period 1994-2002, we find that poor 
performance and financing constraints are the main forces determining the portion of new shares 
sold to the general public at SIP-time.  Specifically, the government tends to issue more shares in 
firms with limited internal cash generation and high leverage.  Also, the government widens 
ownership to a larger extent in SOEs that receive substantial subsidies.  Public share allocation is 
not positively affected by the market-to-book ratio nor by other variables capturing the firm’s 
growth opportunities, such as the SOE’s pre-SIP sales growth, asset growth and capital 
expenditures.  So, we find no evidence that the raised equity is needed to finance the SOE’s 
current growth opportunities.  The stock market return pre-SIP is not significantly related to the 
fraction of shares sold whereas a clustering of SIPs in the previous year has a positive impact.  
Finally, the results show that the government is cautious in privatizing large SOEs in regulated 
industries as these features negatively affect the allocation of shares to the general public.  
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In a second model, we examine the likelihood that the Chinese government reduces its 
ownership stake below 50% at SIP-time.  The data show that the government is more likely to 
relinquish its majority stake in smaller firms receiving substantial subsidies and those with a low 
market-to-book ratio. 
In sum, these results suggest that the government opens ownership to a larger extent in 
poor-performing SOEs, which is pointed out by their low profitability, highly accumulated debt 
ratios, reliance on government subsidies and limited growth prospects.  Yet, we also show that 
the motives for privatizing Chinese SOEs likely have evolved over time.  The results suggest that 
the Chinese government mainly introduced firms that benefited from a too relaxed (government) 
financing during the early years of its privatization program.  For these firms, which were highly 
levered and consumed substantial subsidies, the government welcomed the stock market as an 
alternative financing source.  Consistent with these arguments is the finding of Su and Fleisher 
(1999) that over 90% of Chinese newly privatized firms listed before June 1994 execute 
seasoned equity offerings within a short period after their SIP.  In later years, the Chinese 
government opens ownership to a larger extent in firms with inferior profitability and limited 
growth prospects.  These findings suggest that recently, the government has started to value the 
market disciplining function of a stock market quotation in an attempt to improve SOE 
performance. 
Finally, we study underpricing in the context of Chinese SIPs, thereby taking into 
account the endogeneity of the public share allocation process.  Overall, the determinants of 
underpricing further illustrate the uniqueness of SIPs compared to private-firm IPOs.  First, there 
is little evidence that information asymmetries regarding the value of the SOE’s assets influence 
first-day returns.  Specifically, we find no relation between firm size and leverage and  
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underpricing whereas the market-to-book ratio has a significantly negative impact.  Yet, 
consistent with earlier studies on Chinese SIPs, a long time lag between share offering and listing 
is found to be a source of uncertainty as this variable is positively related to first-day returns.  We 
also demonstrate that over time the government has succeeded shortening this period, from 
which it has benefited under the form of lower underpricing.  Consistent with the IPO literature, 
first-day returns are significantly larger during booming stock markets whereas share 
pre-allocation to institutional investors is found to reduce underpricing.  Finally, we find that the 
fraction of ownership divested is not significantly related to underpricing whereas this variable 
has a positive impact after taking into account that allocation and pricing likely are determined 
simultaneously.  Overall, these findings support the model of Perotti (1995) that governments 
may use underpricing as a mechanism to facilitate privatizations.  Consistent with the model of 
Biais and Perotti (2002) is that the SIP is underpriced more when shares are also allocated to 
foreign investors in a prior offering on the B share market.  In sum, these results demonstrate that 
uncertainty regarding the government’s commitment to privatization rather than firm value as in 
private-firm IPOs is a major determinant of underpricing in SIPs. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief 
introduction on privatization in China.  Section 3 develops hypotheses from the theories on the 
motives for going public and underpricing.  Section 4 discusses the sample selection criteria and 
presents some descriptive statistics.  Section 5 investigates the determinants of public share 





                                                       
2. Privatizations in China 
The various stages in China’s SOE reform, which officially began with the third Plenum of the 
eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in December 1978, have 
been described in detail by Sun and Tong (2003) and Quan and Huyghebaert (2004).  Overall, the 
reform in China has proceeded without complete market liberalization or democratization, 
which makes it rather unique compared to other mass privatization programs in the former 
communist economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.  Hereafter, we discuss two 
distinctive features of the Chinese privatization process that are relevant for our study.  First, 
nearly all SIPs in China so far are partial ones, where new financing is raised for the SOE and the 
government retains a large stake in most firms, even up to five years after their privatization 
(Quan and Huyghebaert, 2004).  Thereafter, we elaborate on the unique mixed ownership 
structure in newly privatized firms. 
While all of the SOE is commonly sold in an asset sale, SIPs are generally characterized 
by partial offerings.
4  The reason why the Chinese government retains a large stake at SIP is that 
it assigns priority to reforming its SOEs into modern corporations through widening their 
ownership structure, rather than radically changing the nature of ownership.  Bolton (1995), for 
example, argues that the Chinese government’s strategy of reforming state-owned enterprises is 
to encourage competition in product markets and improve the firms’ governance structure 
through opening their ownership structure.  According to Jefferson (1998), such a policy may be 
defensible in the absence of well-functioning property rights markets as otherwise privatization 
could result in the transfer of public assets to private agents who do not use them more efficiently 
 
4 In their 59 country sample of 630 SIPs, Jones et al. (1999) report that only 11.5% of the SIPs involved the sale of 
the entire SOE whereas in only 28.9% of the cases more than 50% of the SOE’s shares were sold at the initial SIP.  
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than under state ownership.
5  Furthermore, under a socialist ideology, the Chinese government 
fears that a rapid and massive privatization might lead to the loss of state-owned assets.  Actually, 
the Chinese government never uses the term privatization in reference to the ownership reform 
of its SOEs, but rather speaks of corporatization (Wei et al., 2005).  Also, Sun and Tong (2003) 
argue that there is not even a single listed former SOE where the government has fully divested 
its stake.  One could question whether such partial privatizations actually have any impact on the 
firms involved, especially when the government continues to control former SOEs.  Gupta 
(2005), however, argues that most privatization programs begin with a period of partial 
privatization, where only non-controlling shares are sold on the stock market.  His results show 
that even such partial privatizations significantly influence profitability, labor productivity and 
investment spending, which makes studying these events relevant. 
Unlike the SIPs studied by Megginson et al. (1994) and Jones et al. (1999), the Chinese 
government does not explicitly sell shares through a secondary offering at the time of the SIP, but 
rather raises new equity for the SOE through a primary offering.  Chinese SIPs thus increase the 
SOE’s asset and equity accounts by the same amount, but also change the firm’s ownership 
structure to some extent.  As a result of the SIP, a new category of shares – A shares – arises.  
These share are exclusively available to Chinese citizens and domestic institutions;
6,7 they are 
 
5 Yet, partial privatization may still be desirable when it contributes to the SOE’s monitoring. 
6 It is required by Chinese corporate law that tradable A shares account for at least 25% of total shares outstanding 
when a company goes public.  However, when the book value of equity exceeds 400,000,000 RMB (approximately 
€ 40,000,000), tradable A shares should represent only 15% of total shares outstanding.  Chinese practice learns that 
these rules were not strictly followed in the early years of the privatization program. 
7 End 2002, the A share market has been opened to some extent to foreign investors.  Specifically, the CSRC and the 
People’s Bank of China jointly announced that foreign institutional investors could apply to become qualified 
investors, QFII.  Once approved by market regulators, QFII will be permitted to conduct limited investments in the 
A share market; overall, the stake of QFII cannot exceed 10% of the shares in any single Chinese firm.  However, as 
we examine SIPs during 1994-2002, this issue is not relevant for our study and we can consider investors in the A 
share market to be Chinese domestic investors.  
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mostly held and traded by individuals, however (Sun and Tong, 2003).  By contrast, the state 
shares retained by the Chinese central and local governments after the firm has been listed (is 
being privatized) cannot be traded freely in the secondary market.
8  Besides, firms may also have 
legal person shares outstanding before SIP, which are the result of historical ownership reforms 
and equity-for-debt swaps.  Legal person shares – which are also non-tradable in the secondary 
market – are owned by domestic institutions.  These include stock-holding companies, non-bank 
financial institutions, and SOEs that have at least one non-state owner acting as co-founder or 
fund provider of the firm under consideration.
9  Typically, a legal person is a large blockholder in 
only one or a few companies.  Legal persons can divest their investment by selling the shares to 
other legal persons, after getting approval from the CSRC (Central Securities Regulatory 
Commission).  Finally, some SOEs issue non-tradable employee shares
10 and/or tradable B, H or 
N shares that are exclusive to foreign investors.
11  B shares are listed on the two national 
exchanges, with those listed on the Shanghai stock exchange (SHSE) denominated in US dollars 
 
8 However, the percentage of state shares in a firm’s total number of shares outstanding may decrease during the 
years after SIP when the government chooses to sell its shares to other institutional investors in a private transaction, 
when the government allows firms to increase their free float, or when it takes cash dividends instead of stock 
dividends.  Although all shareholders now enjoy the same rights according to Chinese law, the state shareholder can 
sometimes choose between a cash dividend and a stock dividend. 
9 Among legal person shares, there is one category of “state-owned legal person shares”, which are held by a parent 
or other firm designated to look after the government’s interests.  The distinction between state shares and 
state-owned legal person shares is not so clear, especially not in the early years of the Chinese privatization process.  
As a matter of fact, state shares and state-owned legal person shares are sometimes classified under the same 
category of “state-owned shares”.  Therefore, in this study we categorize state-owned legal person shares as 
government shares.  The classification is important as Sun and Tong (2003) find that remaining state ownership 
negatively impacts upon post-SIP performance whereas legal persons have a positive impact, which suggests that 
legal persons behave differently from the government. 
10 On average, employee shares account for less than 2% of total shares outstanding and act purely as an incentive 
scheme rather than providing ownership control.  These shares generally become tradable after a lock-up period, 
which usually lasts for six to twelve months after the SIP.  Once sold on the market, these shares become ordinary A 
shares. 
11 To be noted, Chinese domestic investors who have foreign currency accounts with their brokerage firm have been 
allowed to trade B shares since June 2001.  
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whereas those listed on the Shenzhen stock exchange (SZSE) denominated in Hong Kong dollars.  
H shares are listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange.  Up to the end of 2003, 111 firms have 
issued B shares and 90 firms have issued H shares.  The number of firms listing N shares on the 
New York stock exchange remains quite limited. 
At the end of 2003, about two-thirds of total shares outstanding in publicly quoted firms 
remain non-tradable, of which state shares and state-owned legal person shares represent nearly 
80% (Financial Times, March 29, 2005).  As a result, it is impossible to obtain a majority stake in 
most firms through purchasing their shares in the secondary market.  So, the importance of 
non-tradable shares in a typical listed firm is likely to hamper the market disciplining function 
and could even distort the pricing of shares.  As a result, since 2001 the Chinese government has 
invited professionals – including scholars and practitioners – to submit feasible proposals to 
realize the full circulation of part or even all of the non-tradable state and legal person shares in 
listed firms.  The expectation of a massive supply of former non-tradable shares has led to huge 
market panic among investors and has sent both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market to 
historically low prices (see Figure 1).  Even though the specific timetable for the reform is not 
settled yet, the Chinese government has published milestone guidelines in April 2005.  In a first 




Insert Figure 1 
*************** 
3. Theory and Hypotheses 
 
12 In these firms, the owners of non-tradable shares now have to negotiate with the owners of tradable shares for a 
feasible plan, which mainly concerns a compensation in shares or cash for the latter shareholders.  Thereafter, the 
non-tradable shares will become tradable, subject to some constraints.  In particular, shares sold should not exceed 
5% (and 10%) of total shares outstanding within 12 (and 24) months after the expiration of the lock-up period.  Also,  
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When a government sells (part of) an SOE via an SIP, it confronts allocation and pricing 
decisions similar to those faced by owners in private-firm IPOs.  In this section, we therefore 
derive hypotheses on the determinants of public share allocation and underpricing in SIPs, 
starting from the main theories on the motives for going public and underpricing.
13  Thereby, we 
pay special attention to how the differences between an SIP and a private-firm IPO could impact 
the empirical predictions.  Also, as mentioned above, unlike the privatizations in most other 
countries, SIPs in China generally are pure primary offerings, whereby new equity is raised for 
the SOE.  Although the government does not explicitly sell its own shares in such a transaction, 
an SIP inevitably leads to the dilution of government ownership in the newly privatized firm.  We 
therefore believe that the extent to which shares are sold to the general public may reflect the 
government’s motives to raise new equity for the SOE as well as its intentions to diversify the 
firm’s ownership structure.  This approach has also been followed in the empirical IPO literature, 
where IPOs in the US are largely pure primary offerings (e.g., Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001).  
Table 1 summarizes our hypotheses. 
 
3.1. Share Allocation to the General Public 
Regarding the public share allocation process, we are interested in two major decisions taken by 
the Chinese government.  First, what firm and stock market characteristics influence the fraction 
of shares sold to the general public in an SIP.  Second, under what conditions does the 
government relinquish its majority stake in the SOE and thus may actually allow for a control 
transfer.  The literature typically classifies the latter type of privatization as control privatization 
 
whenever the sold shares account for 1% of total shares outstanding, a public announcement is required. 
13 We focus on theories and hypotheses that are most relevant to our purpose of deriving potential determinants of 
the public share allocation and underpricing in SIPs.  
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rather than revenue privatization.  To be noted, the government does not necessarily lose control 
when its ownership is reduced below 50% as it may remain the largest shareholder.  But we do 
believe there is a more radical ownership change in firms where the government gives up its 
majority stake.  In support of our conjecture, Sun and Tong (2003) demonstrate that the changes 
in performance post-SIP are much better for firms where the government ends up with less than 
50% of the shares outstanding whereas Jones et al. (1999) find that when a majority of an SOE is 
sold at SIP, investors require less underpricing.  We use the same variables, which are discussed 
hereafter, to examine these two research questions. 
 
3.1.1. Overcoming Financing Constraints 
As indicated by several studies on the motives for going public (e.g., Pagano et al., 1998; 
Huyghebaert and Van Hulle, 2005), overcoming financing constraints is an important reason 
why firms choose to go public.  According to Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory, 
raising new equity is a final financing resort for firms that do not have enough internal cash 
generation and/or have reached their debt borrowing limits.  Two implications are associated 
with this hypothesis.  First, firms with a low current profitability may raise a larger percentage of 
new equity when going public.  Second, firms with a high debt ratio may reduce their leverage by 
raising more equity at IPO-time.  Pagano et al. (1998) indeed find that the new equity raised by 
Italian IPOs during the 1982-1992 period is mainly used to reduce leverage.  Huyghebaert and 
Van Hulle (2005), in their sample of Belgian IPOs over 1984-2000, find that the size of the 
primary offering is negatively related to the firm’s profitability, although they find no relation 
with leverage. 
The motive of raising new equity likely is also important for firms with significant  
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investment opportunities.  When the owners of high-growth firms are unable or unwilling to 
invest more of their own wealth in the firm, they may decide to raise new equity in a public 
offering to finance the firm’s growth opportunities.  Consistent with this idea, Pagano et al. 
(1998) find that firms in industries with high market-to-book ratios are more likely to go public 
whereas Huyghebaert and Van Hulle (2005) find that a firm’s market-to-book ratio at IPO-time 
positively affects the portion of new equity.  Furthermore, younger and smaller firms raise a 
significantly larger fraction of primary shares at IPO-time. 
The issue of overcoming financing constraints may also apply in the context of SIPs.  
Given the low profitability and high debt ratios of most SOEs (e.g., Wu, 1997; Sun and Song, 
2003),
14 raising equity in public capital markets may be an alternative to debt financing so that 
leverage can be reduced.  Since the corporate bond market almost does not exist in China, bank 
loans are an important component of debt financing.  As pointed out by Gao and Shaffer (1998), 
bank loans in badly performing SOEs have been a major form of soft budget constraints in China.  
Not surprisingly, non-performing loans in state-owned banks are a serious problem in China 
(Sun, 2004).  Consequently, the Chinese government may dislike investing more funds because 
of budgetary reasons rather than because of diversification considerations as in private-firm 
IPOs.  This issue has become especially important with China’s entry into WTO; the 
membership status obliges the Chinese government to further reduce its market disturbing 
support to local firms (Qin, 2004).  To examine whether the nature of the debt influences the SIP 
decision, we include the proportion of debt that consists of bank loans as an additional 
explanatory variable and expect it to be positively related to the percentage of shares sold to the 
 
14 The average debt ratio of state-owned enterprises in China was as high as 67.9% in 1994 and 65.1% in 1996 (Wu, 
1997).  Also, Sun and Tong (2003) report that debt exceeds total assets in 27.6% of the SOEs in 1994.  In our sample, 
however, we find that the average (median) debt ratio amounts to 53.45% (56.98%) before SIP, which is somewhat  
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general public.  Finally, we include the ratio of subsidies to total sales as an additional proxy for 
the firm’s reliance on the government for funding and expect a positive relation with public share 
allocation when the government uses the SIP as an alternative financing source. 
 
3.1.2. Promoting Financial and Operating Performance 
The privatization literature so far has agreed that one of the most important motives for 
privatization lies in the disappointing financial and operating performance of state-owned 
enterprises.  The inability of the government to effectively monitor the SOE’s management and 
the inefficiencies caused by government interference in the firm’s operations have led 
governments to divest their stake in SOEs worldwide (Shleifer, 1998; Megginson and Netter, 
2001).  We therefore expect a larger allocation of shares to the general public in firms with poor 
financial and operating performance pre-SIP.  The objective to promote financial and operating 
efficiency in state-owned firms makes an SIP somewhat different from a private-firm IPO. 
Based on a study of privatization motives for 683 Chinese SOEs over the period 
1995-2001, Guo and Yao (2005) find no significant relation between the likelihood of 
privatization and inefficiencies measured by ROA as well as the gross profitability gap (value 
added divided by total assets) between the SOE and the average private firm in the 
corresponding industry.  Also, as mentioned before, Tian (2001) and Sun and Tong (2003) fail to 
find any significant relation between pre-SIP profitability and government divestment.  In this 
study, we will proxy the firm’s financial performance by ROA.  Unfortunately, we do not have 
data on the number of employees nor on wages paid to calculate the variables most commonly 
used in the literature to determine the SOE’s efficiency (i.e., real sales per employee or net 
 
smaller but still important.  
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income per employee).  This study therefore measures the firm’s operating efficiency by means 
of the ratio of administrative expenses to total sales and the ratio of administrative plus operating 
expenses to total sales. 
 
3.1.3. Windows of Opportunity 
According to the IPO literature, the intent of capturing windows of opportunity is an important 
determinant of the decision to go public (e.g., Ritter, 1991).  Also, firms may issue more shares in 
times of good market assessment or when there is a clustering of IPOs, which induces 
information spillovers (e.g., Booth and Chua, 1996; Van Bommel, 2002).  Huyghebaert and Van 
Hulle (2005), however, find that prevailing market conditions do not directly affect the portion of 
primary shares sold at IPO-time.  In their sample, firms may wish to establish a reputation of 
good behavior vis-à-vis investors as a lot of them plan to go back to the stock market after their 
IPO.  This may not be particularly true for state-owned enterprises, for instance when the SIP is 
considered mainly as a mechanism to impose market discipline on a firm’s management through 
stock prices rather than as a financing vehicle.  Yet, as the Chinese government intends to further 
privatize a lot of its remaining SOEs, it may still care about reputation effects, albeit for a 
different reason.  In particular, the government may wish to establish a reputation of not 
expropriating the wealth of external shareholders in order to facilitate future SIPs. 
When the government tries to exploit windows of opportunity at SIP-time, it likely will 
sell more shares during booming stock markets.  In that case, the market return preceding the SIP 
will be positively related to the fraction of new shares sold.  Also, if the government hopes to 
take advantage of an information spillover effect by selling more shares in times of SIP 
clustering, the fraction of new shares sold to the general public will be positively related to the  
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number of historical SIPs. 
 
3.2. Underpricing 
3.2.1. Ex-ante Uncertainty 
Almost all theories attempting to explain the phenomenon of IPO underpricing, namely the 
positive first-day return on a new offering, start from the existence of information asymmetries.  
Different forms of information asymmetries have led to different explanations for underpricing.  
Information asymmetries between informed and uninformed investors, for example, are the basis 
of Rock’s (1986) winner’s curse model.  Underpricing hereby serves as a compensation for the 
uninformed investors who fear that they are allocated shares only when the offering is being 
over-priced.  Information asymmetries between investors and IPO candidates may also cause a 
lemon’s problem.  As a result, firms of high quality have to sell their shares at a large discount to 
signal their quality (e.g., Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989) 
or to induce investors to produce information (e.g., Chemmanur, 1993). 
Whatever the source of information asymmetries, the theories on IPO underpricing have 
agreed that ex-ante uncertainty regarding firm value is positively related to the magnitude of 
underpricing.  Consequently, smaller and younger firms are expected to incur larger 
underpricing costs as they have lower visibility.  Also, profits from future investment projects 
may be difficult to predict.  Then, firms with significant growth opportunities may have to 
underprice their shares to a larger extent at IPO-time.  These relations have been documented in 
numerous studies on IPO underpricing (e.g., Ibbotson et al., 1993).  We expect the above 
arguments to also apply in the context of SIPs.  So, we hypothesize a negative relation between 
firm size and underpricing and a positive relation between the SOE’s market-to-book ratio and  
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underpricing.  As many SOEs only report the date of incorporation rather than their founding 
date in their SIP prospectus, we are not able to determine the firm’s age in a correct way. 
 
3.2.2. Efforts to Reduce Information Asymmetries 
Firms that face large ex-ante uncertainty regarding their value may do efforts to mitigate 
information asymmetries, to reduce the required underpricing.  First, a high debt ratio pre-IPO is 
sometimes considered as a commitment signal to outside investors as debt financing imposes a 
hard budget constraint on the firm’s management (Heinkel and Zechner, 1990; Nachman and 
Noe, 1994).  Then, leverage will negatively affect underpricing.  In the case of Chinese SIPs, 
however, a high debt ratio may reflect soft budget constraints associated with state loans.  Also, 
bank loans are often used to bail out failing firms rather than to play a monitoring role.  Then, a 
high debt ratio and a debt mix that largely consists of bank loans may add to the uncertainty 
regarding firm value, thereby positively impacting on SIP underpricing.  Consistent with these 
ideas, Su (2004a) finds that leverage pre-SIP and underpricing are positively related. 
Second, the special role of institutional investors in reducing information asymmetries 
recently has received much attention in the IPO literature.  In particular, the use of bookbuilding 
to sell the IPO shares and the pre-allocation of shares to institutional investors can help to 
diminish underpricing (e.g., Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001; Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001; 
Huyghebaert and Van Hulle, 2006).  The general idea underlying bookbuilding is that involving 
professionals who are better able to evaluate the true worth of the firm should help to mitigate 
information asymmetries at IPO-time and therefore reduce underpricing.  Share pre-allocation 
also helps to restrain underpricing as incentive problems with small retail investors are curbed.  
These notions have received some empirical support.  For instance, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm  
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(2002) show that the process of bookbuilding has reduced the indirect issuance costs, which 
mainly consist of underpricing.  Also, Huyghebaert and Van Hulle (2006) find supporting 
evidence that share pre-allocation to institutional investors reduces underpricing and increases 
post-IPO stock liquidity. 
Jones et al. (1999), however, find that privatizing governments typically use fixed-price 
offers rather than bookbuilding to market SOE shares.  As the bookbuilding method has only 
been introduced as of 2004 in China, we are unable to examine its relation with underpricing.  
Yet, this study investigates the impact of share pre-allocation to institutional investors – which 
became possible as of May 1998 – and expects a negative relation with underpricing. 
 
3.2.3. Ownership Divested by the Original Owner 
Another important determinant of underpricing likely is the ownership divested by the original 
owner(s).  Based on the signaling models of Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989), 
owners in high-quality firms signal their firm’s quality by divesting only a small portion of 
shares with large underpricing at IPO-time as they anticipate to recoup the latter costs through 
future seasoned offerings, after firm quality is revealed.  Consequently, these models predict a 
negative relation between ownership divested by original owners and underpricing.  On the other 
hand, as argued by Beatty (1989), smaller levels of ownership divestment reduce the uncertainty 
surrounding the offering and should reduce underpricing.  In that case, the relation between 
ownership divested and underpricing likely is positive. 
In the case of an SIP, it can be argued that the ex-ante uncertainty involves not only firm 
value, but also the government’s commitment to its privatization policy.  As a result, the impact 
of ownership divested by the original owner, namely the state, becomes even more complex.  On  
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the one hand, the government may continue to interfere with the daily operations of a newly 
privatized firm when it retains a high ownership stake.  Then, it may pursue political objectives 
in addition to and in conflict with profit maximization, such as vetoing the layoff of redundant 
workers.  Consistent with these ideas, Vining and Boardman (1992) and Majumdar (1998) find 
evidence that privately owned firms outperform partially privatized firms.  Investors therefore 
may require more underpricing as a compensation for the expected inefficiencies caused by 
continued government interference.  Then, the percentage of shares allocated to the general 
public will be negatively related to first-day returns. 
On the other hand, Perotti (1995) shows that a privatizing government may intentionally 
use both the fraction of shares sold and underpricing as mechanisms to facilitate the privatization.  
In his model, a small percentage ownership divested by the state at SIP-time can be viewed as a 
commitment signal that the government will not expropriate the wealth of external shareholders 
post-SIP, which supports the price at which shares can be sold in later offerings and, at the 
moment of SIP, reduces underpricing.  By contrast, when this market-oriented government 
wishes to sell a relatively large portion of an SOE, it should significantly underprice the SOE in 
the initial offering to signal to investors that it will not interfere with the privatized firm post-SIP.  
The populist government, which cannot resist the political pressure to intervene with the 
privatized firm, will not underprice the SIP to the same extent as this government prefers to raise 
more issue proceeds in the near future, rather than falsely signal a commitment that it cannot 
keep.  In other words, the populist government is too impatient to use small partial sales because 
its policy preferences will eventually become known and so, the offsetting economic benefits 
from privatization will never materialize in its privatizations. 
As argued before, the literature on Chinese SIPs so far has found conflicting results on  
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this relation.  Also, while Mok and Hui (1998) and Chan et al. (2004) find the same positive sign, 
they interpret their results differently.  Mok and Hui suggest that (domestic) investors regard 
ownership retained by the government as a signal of its confidence in future firm performance 
and therefore require less underpricing.  By contrast, Chan et al. argue that investors fear the 
inefficiencies caused by government interference, which results in lower first-day returns.  Yet, 
Perotti’s model indicates the need to control for the endogenous nature of ownership divestment 
when examining its impact on underpricing. 
 
3.2.4. Prevailing Market Conditions 
Studies on IPO underpricing also identify over-optimism and investor fads as a determinant of 
first-day returns (e.g., Ritter, 1991; Shiller, 1990).  Prevailing market conditions may influence 
the investor assessment of firm risk and opportunities.  Specifically, when market returns are 
high or when there is a clustering of IPOs, investors may be less risk averse and/or more 
optimistic regarding future firm performance.  As a result, this may increase first-day returns.  
The empirical evidence on IPOs so far has demonstrated that prevailing market conditions 
pre-IPO influence underpricing.  For instance, Ritter (1984) documents a positive relation 
between the number of prior IPOs and average underpricing during the hot issue market of the 
1980.  Also, Derrien and Womack (2003) find that the market return before IPO significantly 
increases underpricing in 264 French IPOs between 1992 and 1998. 
As pointed out by Mok and Hui (1998) and Su (2004a,b), these arguments are 
particularly important in a relatively young equity market like China.  The reason is that 
investors in an emerging market generally lack investment experience and sometimes are more 
speculative.  We use the historical stock market return as well as the historical SIP volume to  
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capture stock market conditions.  Under this hypothesis, we expect that both variables have a 
positive impact on underpricing.  Up till now, only Su (2004a, b) has examined the relation 
between stock market variables, in particular historical stock market returns, and underpricing in 
Chinese SIPs and he finds mixed evidence. 
************* 
Insert Table 1 
************* 
 
4. Sample Selection and Description  
Our sample includes data on 599 non-financial firms
15 issuing A shares for the first time on the 
Shanghai stock exchange over the period 1994-2002.  This database – which contains 
consolidated financial statement information – was obtained from Shenyin & Wanguo Securities 
Company Limited, one of the most respectable investment bankers in China.  We use 1994 as a 
starting year since new rules closer to international accounting standards were introduced as of 
January 1994.  As a result, including data before 1994 might cause incomparability problems 
(see also Sun and Tong, 2003).  As the data collection process was time-consuming, we only 
included SOEs that became listed on the Shanghai stock exchange in our sample.  While the 
listing requirements on SHSE are more rigorous than on SZSE, Sun and Tong (2003) find that 
SOEs do not behave differently upon SIP across these two exchanges.  To be included in our 
sample, firms were required to have at least one year of pre-privatization consolidated financial 
statements in the database. 
To examine the government’s divestment decision, we select firms in which the Chinese 
government – direct or indirect – owns a stake just before the firm’s SIP.  Specifically, we 
 
15 Financial firms are excluded as these firms differ substantially from others and as their financial statements are 
compiled in another manner.  
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choose firms that have state shares or state-owned legal person shares outstanding before going 
public (see also footnote 9).  Detailed ownership data was collected from the SINA Finance 
database, which provides information on the type of legal persons (state-owned versus 
non-state-owned).  Finally, as noted by many studies using Chinese stock market data (e.g., 
Chan et al., 2004), there is usually a time lag between the stock offering – i.e. the moment when 
the offer price is set – and the actual listing of shares.  In some extreme cases, there is a lag of 
several years for stocks with ‘pending historical problems’.  Given that the decision process for 
listing those SOEs could be different from that of others, we deleted firms where the time lag 
between offering and listing exceeds six months.  Our final sample includes data on 451 SOEs.
16  
For all 451 firms in the sample, we obtained the issue prospectus and the consolidated financial 
statements up till three years before the SIP, if available.  The stock market return data were 
collected from Datastream. 
Table 2, Panel A presents information on the industry distribution of the firms in our 
sample, using the CSRC industry classification.  We provide information for the full sample of 
451 SOEs as well as the limited sample of 368 companies where the government still owns a 
majority stake right before the SOE’s public offering.  The table shows that a majority of the 
sample firms (61.20%) is active in manufacturing.  This is not surprising as Chinese SOEs 
mainly developed out of the necessity of heavy industries and products of strategic importance, 
such as energy resources, primary metals and basic life necessities (Lin et al., 1998).  Panel B 
shows that the annual number of SIPs is fairly large – except for 1995 – but not evenly spread 
over the period 1994-2002. 
 
16 We did robustness checks using other cutoff lags, such as one year (463 firms) and three months (430 firms).  Our 
conclusions continue to hold under these alternative cutoff definitions.  The results from these robustness checks are 
not reported, but can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
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************* 
Insert Table 2 
************* 
Table 3 provides some descriptive statistics on the SIP transaction terms and firms 
involved.  The average (median) fraction of shares sold to the general public at SIP-time is 
27.75% (27.99%) and the average (median) funds collected amount to 238,050,000 
(151,560,000) RMB Yuan after adjusting for the annual inflation rate.
17  Compared to the figures 
reported by Jones et al. (1999), the Chinese government divests a far smaller stake at SIP-time.  
After adjusting for the market return on the first trading day, the average (median) underpricing 
amounts to 137.30% (122.86%), which is comparable to that reported in other studies on 
Chinese SIPs (e.g., Su, 2004a,b), but considerably higher than for SIPs in other countries.  
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) and Laurin et al. (2004), however, point out that initial returns 
are significantly larger in relatively primitive capital markets, which could explain the findings 
for China.  In the case of China, large underpricing may also have been necessary to deal with the 
cultural aversion to stock ownership and to elicit the appetite of the relatively poor median-class 
to participate in one of the largest privatization programs worldwide.  The average (median) 
number of days elapsed between share offering and listing is 34 (23) in our sample.  Even when 
restricting this window to six months, we observe that LISTINGLAG is considerably skewed to 
the right. 
Firm characteristics are measured in the year before SIP.  Firm size differs largely across 
firms, independent of whether it is proxied by total assets or sales.  The average firm has a return 
on assets (EBIT/total assets) of 13.09%.  In addition, the average EBITDA/total assets and 
valued added/total assets amounts to 16.49% and 21.91%, respectively.  As only firms with three 
consecutive years of profits are eligible for listing according to Chinese corporate law, it comes  
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as no surprise that ROA in the year preceding SIP is always positive.  Leverage (book value of 
total debt/book value of total assets) averages to 53.45% in the year before SIP.  As far as the 
composition of the debt (debt mix) is concerned, we find that bank loans on average represent 
48.47% of total debt outstanding.  Given that the corporate bond market is almost non-existent in 
China, the other debt largely consists of loans extended by other SOEs (known as the triangular 
debt problem).  The average percentage of subsidies relative to sales is 0.35%.  The median firm 
did not receive subsidies, however.  For firms with subsidies, this percentage averages to 1.33%. 
Various measures are computed to capture the SOE’s growth opportunities at SIP-time.  
The market-to-book ratio is calculated as the sum of market value of equity (using the offer price) 
and book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets and averages to 2.16.  The 
average investment rate, calculated as capital expenditures relative to total assets, is 9.72% in the 
year before SIP.  In addition, the average assets growth rate pre-SIP is 23.83% whereas the 
average sales growth rate amounts to 16.55%.  As far as operating efficiency is concerned, 
administrative expenses and the sum of administrative and operating expenses on average 
represent 6.67% and 10.96% of sales, respectively. 
Finally, the average firm has a state ownership of 75.48% before and 54.32% after SIP, 
but the high standard deviation indicates that there is a large variation across firms.
18  The 
average percentage of non-tradable legal person shares is 14.60% before and 10.23% after SIP. 
 
************* 
Insert Table 3 
 
17 By November, 2005, 1 RMB Yuan ≅ 0.12 dollar. 
18 Note that the difference between average state ownership before (75.48%) and after (54.32%) SIP is not equal to 
the average percentage of shares sold to the general public (27.75%), due to the difference in denominator when 
calculating average state ownership before and after SIP (i.e. the total number of shares outstanding before and after 




5. Empirical Results 
In this section, we first identify the determinants of the fraction of shares sold to the general 
public in Chinese SIPs over the period 1994-2002.  Then, we investigate the likelihood that the 
Chinese government relinquishes its majority stake at SIP-time.  Section 5.3. examines the 
determinants of SIP underpricing.  Finally, in Section 5.4., we check the interdependencies 
between the share allocation and underpricing decisions. 
 
5.1. Determinants of Public Share Allocation 
5.1.1. Model and Regression Results 
Based on the discussion in Section 3.1., we estimate the following OLS model for the fraction of 
shares sold to the general public at SIP-time: 
 
PUBLIC ALLOCATION 
= f(α1ROA + α2LEVERAGE + α3DEBT MIX + α4SUBSIDIES + α5MARKET-TO-BOOK 
+ α6FIRM SIZE + α7ADMIN/SALES + α8MARKET RETURN + α9VOLUME 
+ α10FOREIGN + α11REGULATED + α12INDUSTRY DUMMIES) 
 
The dependent variable PUBLIC ALLOCATION is measured as the percentage of shares (A 
shares) sold to the general public relative to the total number of shares outstanding at SIP-time.  
The explanatory variables included in the equation are measured during the year before SIP and 
are calculated as follows: ROA is EBIT to total assets.  LEVERAGE is the book value of total 
debt divided by total assets.  DEBT MIX is calculated as bank loans relative to total debt.  
SUBSIDIES is the ratio of subsidies received from the government to total sales.    
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MARKET-TO-BOOK, which is calculated as the sum of market value of equity and book value 
of debt scaled by the book value of total assets, captures the firm’s growth opportunities.  FIRM 
SIZE is measured by the logarithm of total assets pre-SIP and has been deflated to control for the 
annual inflation rate.  ADMIN/SALES is the ratio of administrative expenses to total sales.  
MARKET RETURN is the return on the Shanghai stock exchange in the year before the SIP 
whereas VOLUME is the number of SIPs in the year preceding SIP scaled by the total number of 
SIPs in the raw data sample (599 firms). 
In addition, we control for the fact that some SOEs also issue B or H shares to foreign 
(institutional) investors, which usually occurs some time before their A share offering.  As the 
B/H share market is segmented from the A share market and as the B/H share market is not liquid 
(e.g., Mok and Hui, 1998), we consider the real SIP to start at the firm’s public A share 
offering.
19  Yet, for these firms, the fraction of shares sold to the general public at SIP-time likely 
is lower, ceteris paribus.  FOREIGN has the value of one if there is a B/H share offering 
preceding the SIP and zero otherwise.  In our sample, 32 firms issue B or H shares  before their A 
share offering.  For these firms, the average (median) percentage of shares offered to foreign 
investors equals 30.40% (27.99%).  Finally, we control for the fact that the government likely 
opens ownership to a smaller extent in highly regulated SOEs.  China regulates utilities, energy, 
telecommunications, and the financial industries (see also Sun and Tong, 2003).  For the 19 
SOEs in these industries, REGULATED equals one.  Besides, we also include 14 industry 
dummy variables to control for industry-specific determinants of the public share allocation 
 
19 Most studies on Chinese SIPs make the same assumption, although they do not always explicitly spell out this 
(e.g., Sun and Tong, 2003; Wei et al., 2005).  Also, studies on IPO underpricing in China investigate first-day returns 
in the A share market, irrespective of whether the firm also introduced shares on the B/H share market.  However, we 
have checked the robustness of our results when we leave out the 32 firms that issue B or H shares from the sample.  
We find that our conclusions continue to hold in this restricted sample even though the model’s explanatory power is  
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process.  These industry dummies are based on the Chinese CSRC industry classification and are 
included for each industry that contains at least ten SIPs in our sample. 
To limit the influence of outliers, all variables – except dummy variables – are 
winsorized at 5-95%, i.e. the corresponding percentiles replace extreme values.  Table 4 presents 
the correlation matrix among dependent and explanatory variables.  Multicollinearity is unlikely 
to be a problem since pairwise correlations among the explanatory variables never exceed 0.7 
and as the variance inflation factors are all below 5 (Judge et al., 1988).  Yet, as we notice that 
the correlation coefficient between ROA and MARKET-TO-BOOK amounts to 0.66, we include 
these variables together as well as separately in the model.  Table 5, Panel A presents the results 
of these three OLS regression models.  Panel B and C then report the results when the full sample 
is split up into two sub-periods, to test whether the determinants of public share allocation have 
changed over time. 
Overall, the results in Table 5, Panel A confirm that poor SOE performance and 
financing constraints are the main driving forces behind the government’s decision to sell shares 
to the general public at SIP-time.  First, ROA, the proxy for internal cash generation, is 
significantly negatively related to PUBLIC ALLOCATION.  The government thus sells more 
(primary) shares in firms with limited profitability.  This finding is robust when removing the 
market-to-book ratio from the model in column two.  When internal cash generation is measured 
by EBITDA
20 or value added relative to total assets, this relation continues to hold.  Second, 
leverage is significantly positively related to PUBLIC ALLOCATION, which indicates that the 
wish to reduce the debt ratio is an important determinant of the fraction of new shares issued at 
 
reduced.  The results of this robustness check are not reported, but can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
20 We do not use EBITDA in the base model, as for 62 firms the data on non-cash expenses in the year(s) before SIP 
are not available.  Yet, when we run the regression model on the reduced sample of 389 firms as well as a sample  
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SIP-time.  These results contrast with the findings of Sun and Tong (2003), who find no relation 
with profitability, but show that the Chinese government retains more shares in highly leveraged 
firms.
21  The composition of the debt has no impact, however.  The reason could be that we are 
not able to distinguish between performing bank loans and non-performing bank loans in 
state-owned banks.  Interestingly, we find that SUBSIDIES significantly increases the fraction 
of new shares allocated to the general public.  Although the percentage of subsidies relative to 
sales may not be a perfect proxy for soft budget constraints, it does provide some evidence that 
the government is motivated to ease the problem by means of the public equity market. 
Investment opportunities have no impact on the fraction of primary shares sold at 
SIP-time.  This finding is robust after excluding ROA from the model in column three.   
Furthermore, when we delete the stock market variables (MARKET RETURN and VOLUME) 
from the model, the variables capturing investment opportunities remain insignificantly related 
to public share allocation.  So, these market variables are not spuriously capturing the firm’s 
growth prospects.  Overall, these findings add further substance to the conclusion of Yu and 
Cheng (2001) that seasoned equity offerings in China are not driven by investment opportunities 
either. 
Consistent with Sun and Tong (2003), we find that the government opens ownership to a 
smaller extent in large firms, ceteris paribus.  This result likely reflects that the Chinese 
government is more cautious in dealing with the privatization of the larger SOEs since these 
firms have more employees and usually incur more organizational and social problems upon 
widening their ownership structure.  We find no significant relation between public share 
 
where missing values for EBITDA are replaced by the sample median, we find that our conclusions are robust. 
21 We have checked that the difference is sampling period is not driving these divergent results by estimating our 
model on the SIPs over 1994-1998, which is the period examined by Sun and Tong (2003).  Even in this subperiod,  
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allocation and operating efficiency, proxied by the ratio of administrative expenses to total sales.  
The latter conclusion also holds when using the ratio of administrative plus operating expenses 
to total sales to measure the SOE’s efficiency.  Yet, we do recognize that these variables are not 
generally accepted proxies for operating efficiency. 
The coefficient on MARKET RETURN is not significant, which is consistent with the 
idea that the government may wish to establish a reputation of not expropriating the wealth of 
external shareholders in order to facilitate future SIPs.  In contrast to private-firm IPOs, where 
the listing usually is a one-time-event only for owners, a government that initiates a privatization 
program has to take into account that selling more – highly priced – shares during periods of 
market (over-)optimism may fold the success of future SIPs.  The reason is that after investors 
have learned about the government’s opportunistic behavior, it may be hard to convince them to 
participate in later SIPs.  If anything, the negative coefficient on MARKET RETURN, which is 
marginally significant, suggests that fewer shares are sold when stock prices are booming.  We 
find that this result is robust when measuring historical stock market returns over other windows 
(six, three and one month(s)) before the SIP.  By contrast, VOLUME is significantly positively 
related to PUBLIC ALLOCATION.  So, the government tends to issue more shares following a 
hot SIP-year, i.e. when there is a clustering of SIPs in the previous year.  Whereas this positive 
coefficient is consistent with the IPO literature, where it is argued to be the result of an 
information spillover effect, a more simple explanation may hold in the case of SIPs.   
Specifically, the Chinese government may allow fewer SOEs to go public following a year with 
a lot of listings.  As a result, one single firm may be allowed to raise a larger amount of equity 
and new shares. 
 
we find that leverage is significantly positively related to PUBLIC ALLOCATION.  
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Finally, the variable FOREIGN is significantly negatively related to public share 
allocation, confirming that fewer shares are sold to the general public if shares are also offered to 
foreign investors (usually within the same year).  Also, the coefficient on REGULATED is 
significantly negative, which supports the idea that the government is careful in privatizing 
SOEs that are particularly vulnerable to post-SIP government changes in regulation or 
authorized rates (Perotti, 1995).  Indeed, by retaining a large stake in these firms, the government 
can signal to investors that policy reversals are unlikely.  As far as the industry dummy variables 
are concerned, we find that the government opens ownership to a smaller extent in SOEs in IT, 
pharmaceutical, retail and conglomerates industries (not reported).  Yet, when year dummies are 
included, the latter two industry dummies are no longer statistically significant.
22
In Panel B and C, we split up the whole sampling period into two sub-periods using 1999 
as a dividing year.  By examining SIPs before and as of 1999 respectively, we are able to 
investigate whether the determinants of public share allocation have changed over time.   
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) argue that during the early stages of a privatization program, 
there may be greater uncertainty regarding the program and government officials may try to 
solidify political support.  The reason why we use 1999 as cutoff year is that up till 1999, the 
Chinese central government set annual national quotas for IPOs (see also Sun and Tong, 2003).  
Thereby, the government may have restrained the number of shares to be sold to the general 
public for a single firm, in order to allow more firms to go public.  The average (median) 
PUBLIC ALLOCATION amounts to 24.28% (24.15%) before and 30.89% (31.58%) after 1999.  
In the split-sample regression models, we are not able to include both ROA and 
MARKET-TO-BOOK into one model as the correlation coefficient between these two variables 
 
22 Also, in this model the market-to-book ratio becomes significantly negative.  We elaborate on this result further on  
 32
                                                                                                                                                                              
now amounts to 0.7056 and 0.7086, respectively.  Not surprisingly, the high correlation 
coefficient and the more limited sample size in the subsamples led to estimation problems. 
We find that the significance of the variables LEVERAGE, SUBSIDIES and 
REGULATED in the full sample is driven by the SIPs during 1994-1998 (Panel B).  For the 
second subperiod (1999-2002), the parameter estimates of these variables are not significantly 
different from zero.  Yet, we do find that the coefficients of ROA and MARKET-TO-BOOK are 
significantly negative in the latter subperiod (Panel C) whereas these variables have no impact in 
the earlier window.  Finally, the size and significance levels of the other variables across the two 
subperiods are largely comparable to those in Panel A. 
Overall, these results seem to suggest that during the early privatization years, the 
Chinese government mainly introduced firms that benefited from a too relaxed (government) 
financing.  For these firms, which were highly levered and consumed substantial subsidies, the 
government likely welcomed the stock market as an alternative financing source.  Indeed, in 
these firms, a larger fraction of new shares was raised.  These findings are consistent with Tian 
(2001) and Sun and Tong (2003), who find that there is no obvious relation between pre-SIP 
profitability and the change in state ownership for Chinese SIPs before 1999.  Interestingly, Su 
and Fleisher (1999) find that over 90% of Chinese newly privatized firms listed before June 1994 
execute seasoned equity offerings within a short period after their SIP whereas Yu and Cheng 
(2001) conclude that such offerings are not driven by investment opportunities.  In the later years 
of its privatization program, we find that the government opens ownership to a larger extent in 
firms with inferior profitability and limited growth prospects.  These results suggest that after 
having acquired some privatization experience, the Chinese government has started to value the 
 
in the paper.  
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market disciplining function of a stock market quotation in an attempt to improve SOE 
performance.  A potential explanation could be that the development of domestic capital markets 
(i.e. pricing efficiency, liquidity, transparency, etc.) is needed before the market disciplining 
function of listing can come to effect.  Gupta (2005), for instance, shows that even partial 
privatizations may contribute to performance improvements, because of a market information 
effect.  Consistent with this idea, Fama (1980) suggests that stock prices can serve as a signal of 
managerial ability whereas Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) and Tirole (2001) argue that share 
prices can be used to design more effective incentive schemes for the firm’s management.  Yet, 
markets that are not sufficiently developed likely will find it difficult to play such a role. 
******************* 
Insert Tables 4 and 5 
******************* 
 
5.1.2. Robustness Checks 
As argued by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and Arugaslan et al. (2004), a tobit analysis might 
be more appropriate for fractional data that are censored at zero to the left and at one to the right.  
For the purpose of finding out whether a different methodology might change our conclusions, 
we also ran a tobit analysis on our sample.  Our conclusions remain robust.  In addition, we 
calculated the explanatory variables using two-year averages of firm-level variables whenever 
financial statements were available.  This robustness check should help to reduce the potential 
manipulation of annual accounts in the year before going public.
23  We find that in this limited 
sample, our conclusions continue to hold.  Finally, we also used 1998 and 2000 as cutoff year for 
the split-sample regressions and find that the results are qualitatively the same.  The outcomes of 
 
23 Teoh et al. (1998), for example, find that for private-firm IPOs, financial statements are dressed up in the year 
before going public.  
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these additional robustness checks are not reported in the paper, but are available from the 
authors upon request. 
 
5.2. Determinants of Relinquishing a Majority Stake at SIP-time 
In this section, we set up a multivariate logit model to examine the likelihood of government 
ownership (direct and indirect via state-owned legal person shares) decreasing below 50% at 
SIP-time.  In our sample, the Chinese government owns a majority stake in 368 SOEs right 
before their SIP; in 62 firms (16.85%), the governments relinquishes this majority stake at the 
moment of SIP.  The variables included are the same as those used in the OLS model on the size 
of public share allocation.  However, because of the reduced sample size, including all 14 
above-discussed industry dummy variables posed a convergence problem.  So, the logit 
regression model only includes a dummy variable for the five largest industries in the reduced 
sample.  The results are presented in Table 6. 
Overall, we find that ROA and LEVERAGE, which were highly significant in the OLS 
model, do not affect the likelihood of selling a majority stake at SIP-time.  This result may not be 
surprising given the summary statistics that we reported for these variables in Table 3.  In other 
words, none of the SOEs in our sample are excessively levered or loss-making and, thus, based 
upon the previous OLS model, the government would not sell a very large stake.  Interestingly, 
the results show that the market-to-book ratio becomes significantly negative in the logit model.  
This finding indicates that the government is less likely to relinquish its majority stake in firms 
with favorable growth prospects, ceteris paribus. 
Finally, the variables SUBSIDIES, FIRM SIZE and FOREIGN continue to play a role.  
The government is more likely to give up its majority stake in smaller firms and SOEs that  
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receive substantial subsidies.  Also, in SOEs that sell shares to foreign investors, the government 
is more likely to end up with an ownership stake below 50%. 
************* 
Insert Table 6 
************* 
 
5.3. Determinants of Underpricing 
5.3.1. Model and Regression Results 
In this section, we investigate the determinants of underpricing in Chinese SIPs using an 
OLS regression model.  UNDERPRICING is hereby defined as the first-day stock return (over 
offer price) minus the corresponding Shanghai stock market return.  The OLS model – which 
was developed in Section 3.2. – looks as follows: 
 
UNDERPRICING 
= f(β1LEVERAGE + β2DEBT MIX + β3MARKET-TO-BOOK + β4FIRM SIZE + 
β5MARKET RETURN + β6VOLUME + β7LISTINGLAG + β8PREALLOCATION + 
β9FOREIGN + β10REGULATED + β11INDUSTRY DUMMIES) 
 
Most variables have been defined before, except for LISTINGLAG and PREALLOCATION.  
LISTINGLAG is the logarithm of the number of days elapsed between the start of the share 
offering and the actual share listing (see also Chowdhry and Sherman, 1996).  Also, during the 
period from May 1998 to August 2000 the Chinese government allowed 48 firms issuing more 
than 50,000,000 shares to pre-allocate shares to investment funds.  Besides, since 2000, 13 firms 
in our sample pre-allocated shares to other ‘strategic’ institutional investors.  The dummy 
variable PREALLOCATION equals one if pre-allocation happened and zero otherwise. 
Table 7 provides an overview of the correlations among all variables.  As the maximum  
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correlation coefficient is only 0.4281, estimation problems due to multicollinearity are unlikely.  
This is confirmed by the variance inflation factors.  Table 8, Panel A presents the results of the 
OLS regression model.  In this model, LEVERAGE as well as DEBT MIX have no impact on 
SIP underpricing.  This result is not surprising as debt financing imposes no hard disciplining on 
the firm’s management in the context of Chinese SIPs.  Interestingly, firms with better growth 
prospects as captured by a higher market-to-book ratio incur significantly less underpricing, 
despite the uncertainties associated with future investment projects.  Yet, consistent with the IPO 
literature, FIRM SIZE – which in the IPO literature generally proxies for the importance of 
information asymmetries regarding firm value – is significantly negative.  In addition, we find 
that the stock market return and the number of SIPs in the previous year have a significantly 
positive impact, which, to some extent, may reflect the existence of investor (over-)optimism.  
This is consistent with Su (2004b) who finds that the market return pre-SIP is positively related 
to underpricing.  Indeed, the positive sign for VOLUME is inconsistent with the idea that this 
variable captures information spillovers in the underpricing equation as such spillovers should 
lead to a more accurate pricing of the SOE.  However, we should treat the latter conclusion with 
caution, as VOLUME is no longer significantly different from zero in the 3SLS model (see 
Section 5.4. hereafter).  To be noted, when we calculate the return on the Shanghai stock 
exchange during the six, three or one month(s) before SIP, we find that MARKET RETURN 
remains significantly positive. 
Consistent with the conclusions of previous papers on underpricing in the Chinese stock 
market (e.g., Chan et al., 2004), the time lag between share offering and listing significantly 
increases underpricing.  The results further show that domestic investors need not be 
compensated with higher underpricing when shares are allocated to foreign investors, but this  
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conclusion again changes in the 3SLS model.  Unlike Dewenter and Malatesta (1997), who 
conclude that first-day returns are significantly larger in highly regulated industries, we find no 
relation between REGULATED and underpricing in Table 8, Panel A.  Yet, we documented in 
the previous section that the Chinese government is cautious in privatizing these firms, which 
could explain our finding in the underpricing model. 
Next, we split up the whole sampling period into two subperiods (before and after 1999) 
and report the results in Panel B and C, respectively.  The average (median) UNDERPRICING 
amounts to 136.98% (118.51%) before and 137.59% (127.82%) after 1999.  Overall, the 
determinants of underpricing are similar across these two windows, except that LISTINGLAG is 
only significant in the early privatization years.  As the average LISTINGLAG in the first 
subperiod amounts to 40 days compared to only 25 days in the second subperiod, we conclude 
that the Chinese government has been able to reduce the uncertainty surrounding SIPs over time, 
from which it has benefited under the form of a better pricing of the SIP. 
Finally, to compare our conclusions with those of previous studies that consider the 
government divestment process to be exogenous, we re-estimate the above OLS model where we 
also include PUBLIC ALLOCATION.  We find that the coefficient on this variable is not 
significantly different from zero whereas the results on the other variables do not change.  In the 
next section, we take the potential simultaneity of both variables into account. 
******************* 
Insert Tables 7 and 8 
******************** 
 
5.4. Simultaneous Equations Model 
Previous studies on underpricing in the Chinese stock market (e.g., Mok and Hui, 1998; Chan et  
al., 2004; Chen et al., 2004) fail to consider that underpricing and public share allocation likely 
are jointly determined by the government when a SOE is selected for listing.  As we already 
demonstrated in the previous sections; various firm and stock market characteristics impact the 
public share allocation decision.  Simply including the observed public allocation at SIP-time 
likely causes an endogeneity problem and, therefore, may give rise to spurious conclusions for 
the relation between this variable and underpricing.  Similarly, the expected underpricing may 
influence the government’s selling decision at SIP-time.  Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Mauer 
and Senbet (1992), for example, present evidence that initial returns are negatively related to the 
offering size in IPOs.  For SIPs, Jones et al. (1999) find that first-day returns are positively 
related to the percentage of an SOE sold in the offering.  Furthermore, the theoretical model of 
Perotti (1995) argues that the government may simultaneously use public share allocation and 
underpricing to show the seriousness of its intents.  Therefore, in this section we build a 
simultaneous equations model for PUBLIC ALLOCATION and UNDERPRICING, which 
looks as follows: 
 
PUBLIC ALLOCATION 
= f(α1UNDERPRICING + α2ROA + α3LEVERAGE + α4DEBT MIX + α5SUBSIDIES + 
α6MARKET-TO-BOOK + α7FIRM SIZE + α8ADMIN/SALES + α9MARKET RETURN + 
α10VOLUME + α11FOREIGN + α12REGULATED + α13INDUSTRY DUMMIES) 
 
UNDERPRICING 
= f(β1PUBLIC ALLOCATION + β2LEVERAGE + β3DEBT MIX + β4MARKET-TO-BOOK + 
β5FIRM SIZE + β6MARKET RETURN + β7VOLUME + β8LISTINGLAG + 
β9PREALLOCATION + β10FOREIGN + β11REGULATED + β12INDUSTRY DUMMIES) 
 
Table 9 reports the results of the simultaneous equations model.  The system is estimated 
by three-stage least squares (3SLS), which takes the information contained in the 
contemporaneous correlations among the error terms into account.  Both of the equations are 
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over-identified since several of the exogenous variables are unique to each equation.  Judge et al. 
(1988) argue that the asymptotic distribution of 3SLS estimators is normal.  The data show that 
underpricing has no significant impact on public share allocation in column one of Table 9.  Also, 
the parameter estimates and significance levels of the other variables are not affected when 
compared to Table 5, Panel A.  Yet, we do find that the fraction of shares sold to the general 
public significantly positively affects underpricing in column two of Table 9.  Overall, this result 
is consistent with the prediction of Perotti (1995) that the relation between underpricing and 
capital divested is positive when the government wants to show its commitment to privatization.  
In that case, a market-oriented government will either sell a small portion with limited 
underpricing or a large portion with more underpricing to differentiate itself from a more 
populist government.  Our results demonstrate that the fraction of shares sold is determined first 
and that required underpricing follows from it. 
Next, we find that some other variables – FIRM SIZE and VOLUME – that were highly 
significant in the OLS model are no longer significant in the underpricing equation of Table 9.
24  
This indicates that their impact in Table 8 was driven by the fact that these variables basically 
influence the public share allocation decision, as was already documented earlier in Table 5.  
More generally, the lack of significance of firm size and leverage and the negative relation of 
MARKET-TO-BOOK indicate that the ex-ante uncertainty surrounding an SIP is different from 
that in a private-firm IPO.  These results add further support to the conclusion of Jones et al. 
(1999) that the commonly accepted asymmetric-information-based explanations for 
underpricing play little or no role in explaining initial returns in SIPs.  Yet, a long time lag 
between share offering and listing is found to be a source of uncertainty in the case of Chinese 
 
24 When we delete PREALLOCATION from the model, we find that firm size is not significantly related to  
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SIPs. 
Finally, we find evidence that share pre-allocation to institutional investors decreases 
underpricing whereas the pre-issuance of shares to foreign investors leads to higher first-day 
returns.  The latter finding is consistent with Biais and Perotti’s (2002) prediction that when 
shares are sold to foreign investors, domestic investors need to be compensated by larger 
underpricing for their limited stake in the offering.  The reason is that the likelihood of 
interference is higher when the shares in the SIP are not sufficiently spread among the 
median-class.  Yet, a positive sign for FOREIGN could also indicate that domestic investors 
have more confidence in the performance of the SOE post-SIP, thereby bidding a higher price for 
the firm’s shares, ceteris paribus.  As Sun and Tong (2003) find that SOEs with foreign 
ownership do not perform better post-SIP, the latter explanation can be rejected. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Using a sample of 451 Chinese SIPs over the period 1994-2002, we find substantial 
evidence that the government’s decision process in privatization is not a black box, whereby the 
fraction of shares allocated to the general public and underpricing are highly politized and driven 
by variables other than economic merit, attractiveness to investors, or the need of capital (e.g., 
Wei et al., 2005).  Our study shows that poor performance and financing constraints largely drive 
the public share allocation decision process.  Specifically, SOEs with low profitability and high 
leverage raise a larger portion of new shares at SIP-time.  Also, ownership is opened to a larger 
extent in firms that receive substantial subsidies.  By contrast, the government is cautious in 
privatizing large SOEs in regulated industries as these features negatively affect the allocation of 
 
underpricing either.  So, PREALLOCATION is not spuriously proxying for firm size in our model.  
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shares to the general public.  The stock market return pre-SIP is not significantly related to the 
fraction of shares sold, supporting the idea that the government wishes to establish a reputation 
of not expropriating the wealth of external investors, to facilitate future SIPs.  A clustering of 
SIPs in the previous year is shown to increase public share allocation.  Finally, we find no 
evidence that the raised equity is needed to finance the SOE’s growth as none of the variables 
capturing the firm’s investment opportunities is significantly different from zero.  Yet, we do 
find that that the government is more likely to relinquish its majority stake in firms with limited 
growth prospects. 
The results on underpricing provide support for Perotti’s prediction that the government 
uses underpricing to facilitate privatizations.  Specifically, after the endogeneity of the public 
share allocation decision is accounted for, we find that this variable is significantly positively 
related to first-day returns.  This indicates that the government needs to offer larger underpricing 
when it wishes to divest more.  In addition, domestic investors are compensated with more 
underpricing when shares are allocated to foreign investors, thereby limiting the size of the 
public share offering.  Consistent with the IPO literature, we find that underpricing is larger 
when investors are (over-)optimistic and when shares are pre-allocated to institutional investors.  
Unlike the IPO literature, we find that the market-to-book ratio is significantly negatively related 
to underpricing whereas firm size and leverage have no impact.  Finally, a long time lag between 
share offering and listing is found to be a source of uncertainty in the case of Chinese SIPs as this 
variable is positively related to first-day returns.  Overall, these results illustrate that 
underpricing in SIPs occurs for different reasons than underpricing in private-firm IPOs. 
In sum, our paper contributes to the literature by showing that, even when controlling for 
some peculiarities associated with an emerging stock market like China, theories and hypotheses  
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developed for the IPO of private firms cannot be easily transferred to the context of share issuing 
privatizations.  This conclusion is remarkable as it is obtained in the context of SIPs where the 
government raises new equity for the SOE at the time of the SIP rather than simply transfers its 
ownership to the private sector by selling its own, secondary shares.  Although the terms share 
issuing privatization (SIP) and privatization IPO (PIPO) are often used interchangeably in the 
literature, our study thus strongly pleads for using the first.  Furthermore, our paper – using 
micro-data on SOEs involved in SIPs – provides more substance to the conclusion of Jones et al. 
(1999) – which is based on macro-economic variables – that SIPs are largely structured so as to 
overcome the political obstacles that stand in the way of successful privatization and the 
economic benefits that might flow from it.  In addition, this paper is the first to show that the 
motives behind and the structuring of a privatization program may evolve over time.  In the case 
of China, we document that during the early stage, the government mainly used the SIP to deal 
with the SOE’s too relaxed (government) financing whereas later on, the potential to discipline 
SOEs (or their managers) became more important.  A tentative explanation, which is not 
elaborated on in this paper, is that as the country’s national exchanges were established only in 
the beginning of the 1990s, capital markets in the early stage of privatization did not meet the 
minimum level of development and depth to play a monitoring and disciplining function. 
Last but not least, our research has some major implications for future studies on Chinese 
SIPs.  The failure to take the endogeneity of the share allocation decision process into account 
might lead to spurious conclusions regarding the evaluation of performance changes following 
SIP, for example.  Also, our study sheds some light on why the outcome of SOE reform in China 
is unsatisfactory so far.  A lot of authors assign this to the partial nature of privatizations in China, 
where the government continues to hold a large majority stake in newly privatized enterprises  
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(e.g., Xu and Wang, 1997; Chen et al., 2002).  They argue that when the stock market is not able 
to perform its disciplining function, e.g. in the absence of the threat of hostile takeover because 
of a too large state ownership, agency problems between managers and shareholders cannot be 
solved.  Our results suggest that this may be only one part of the story, especially in countries 
with relatively young capital markets.  The reason likely is that when capital markets are not 
sufficiently developed, they are not able to play a market disciplining function by conveying 
information on managerial ability.  
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Figure 1: Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index (2001-01-01 to 2004-12-31) 
 
 







































































































































































































Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses 
ROA is EBIT to total assets whereas LEVERAGE is the book value of total debt divided by total assets in the year 
before SIP.  DEBT MIX is the ratio of short-term and long-term bank loans to total debt.  SUBSIDIES is the ratio of 
subsidies scaled by sales in the year before SIP.  MARKET-TO-BOOK is market value of equity (using the offer 
price) plus book value of debt/book value of total assets.  FIRM SIZE is the logarithm of total assets in the year 
before SIP.  ADMIN/SALES is administrative expenses to total sales.  MARKET RETURN is the return on the 
Shanghai stock exchange in the year before SIP whereas VOLUME is the number of SIPs in the year before SIP 
scaled by the total number of SIPs in the sample.  LISTINGLAG is the logarithm of the number of days elapsed 
between the start of share offering and the actual share listing.  PREALLOCATION equals one if pre-allocation of 
shares to institutional investors happened and zero otherwise. 
 
Panel A: Hypotheses for share allocation to the general public 
 PUBLIC  ALLOCATION  (the fraction of new 
shares sold to the general public at SIP-time) 
Overcoming Financing Constraints  ROA: − 
 LEVERAGE:  + 
  DEBT MIX: + 
 SUBSIDIES:  + 
  MARKET-TO-BOOK: + 
FIRM SIZE: − 




Windows of Opportunity  MARKET RETURN: + 
 VOLUME:  + 
   
 
 
Panel B: Hypotheses for underpricing 
  UNDERPRICING (first-day stock return over 
offer price minus the corresponding Shanghai 
stock market return) 
Ex-ante Uncertainty  MARKET-TO-BOOK: + 
  FIRM SIZE: − 
(in the context of Chinese SIPs)  LISTINGLAG: + 
Efforts to Reduce Information Asymmetries LEVERAGE: −/+ 
  DEBT MIX: + 
PREALLOACTION: − 
Ownership Divested by the Original Owner  PUBLIC ALLOCATION: +/− 
Prevailing Market Conditions  MARKET RETURN: + 
  VOLUME: +  
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Table 2: Industry and Annual Distribution of the Sample 
Panel A: Industry Distribution of the Sample Firms 
Column one contains the industry distribution for the full sample of 451 firms based on the Chinese Central 
Securities Regulatory Commission industry classification whereas column two is based on the limited sample of 
368 firms where the government stake right before SIP exceeds 50%.  In addition, column three and four report the 
industry distribution when the total sample is split up into two subsamples using 1999 as a dividing line. 
 





Agriculture, forestry and fishing  16 13 5 11
Mining  762  5
Electricity, gas and water 
production and supply 
18 16 9 9
Construction  994  5
Transportation and storage  29 26 8 21
Information technology  21 15 14 7
Retail and wholesale trade  39 28 30 9
Real estate  873  5
Services  14 11 8 6
Media  221  1
Conglomerates  12 7 10 2
Manufacturing  276 228 120 156
  Food & beverages  24  22  14  10 
    Textile  18 9 7  11 
  Lumber & furniture  1  0  0  1 
  Printing  12  10  8  4 
  Petroleum, chemicals and plastic products  51  44  22  29 
    Electronics  12 8 5 7 
  Metal & non-metal  50  49  19  31 
    Machines  72 62 33 39 
    Pharmaceuticals  30 20 12 18 
    Other  manufacturing  6 4 0 6 
Total number of firms  451 368 214 237
Panel B: Annual Numbers of IPOs and SIPs 




(incl. only SIPs) 
Limited sample 
1994  66 42 33
1995  15 5 4
1996  103 63 48
1997  85 59 46
1998  53 45 44
1999  45 36 29
2000  86 76 60
2001  78 65 55
2002  68 60 49
TOTAL  599 451 368 
Table 3: Summary Statistics for the Total Sample of N = 451 SIPs 
PUBLIC ALLOCATION is the fraction of shares (A shares) sold to the general public relative to the total number of shares outstanding at SIP-time.  FUNDS COLLECTED is the 
number of new shares offered times the offer price and has been deflated.  UNDERPRICING is the first-day stock return minus the corresponding market return.  LISTINGLAG is the 
number of days elapsed between the share offering and listing.  Firm characteristics are measured in the year before SIP.  TOTAL ASSETS and SALES have both been deflated.  ROA 
is EBIT/total assets.  LEVERAGE is book value of total debt/book value of total assets.  DEBT MIX is the ratio of short-term and long-term bank loans to total debt.  SUBSIDIES is the 
ratio of subsidies received from the government to sales.  MARKET-TO-BOOK is the sum of market value of equity (using the offer price) and book value of debt scaled by book value 
of total assets.  INVESTMENT RATE is capital expenditures scaled by total assets.  ASSETS (SALES) GROWTH RATE is the growth rate of assets (sales) from two to one year before 
SIP and has been deflated.  ADMIN/SALES is administrative expenses scaled by sales.  ADMIN&OP/SALES is the sum of administrative and operating expenses scaled by sales.  
STATE OWNERSHIP is the fraction of shares owned by the government (direct and indirect via state-owned legal persons) before and right after SIP.  LEGAL PERSON 
OWNERSHIP is the fraction of non-state-owned legal person shares before and right after SIP. 
 
Variable              Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
SIP TRANSACTION       
PUBLIC ALLOCATION   0.2775  0.2799   0.0890  0.0277  0.5479  
FUNDS COLLECTED (RMB YUAN)  238,050,000  151,560,000   457,215,767   18,287,612   5,793,740,001 
UNDERPRICING  1.3730 1.2286 0.8894 0.0032 6.6143   
LISTINGLAG          34 23 31 9 175 
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS       
TOTAL ASSETS (RMB YUAN)  1,074,400,000   237,830,000   8,647,334,414   30,280,500   170,040,000,000  
SALES (RMB YUAN)  783,400,000   173,410,000   7,643,974,374   6,888,650   161,069,000,000  
ROA  0.1309 0.1263    0.0546 0.0437 0.2441   
EBITDA/TOTAL  ASSETS            0.1649 0.1532 0.0676 0.0637 0.3450
VALUE  ADDED/TOTAL  ASSETS            0.2191 0.1995 0.1034 0.0666 0.4623
LEVERAGE  0.5345              0.5698 0.1351 0.2278 0.6975
DEBT MIX                   0.4847 0.5260 0.2219 0.0021 0.8072
SUBSIDIES                0.0035 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0314
MARKET-TO-BOOK                2.1622 2.0126 0.7516 1.1651 4.0506
INVESTMENT RATE                   0.0972 0.0706 0.0953 0.0001 0.3801
ASSETS GROWTH RATE  0.2383  0.1631   0.3031  -0.1119  1.1405  
SALES  GROWTH RATE                 0.1655 0.1230 0.2362 -0.1920 0.8387
ADMIN/SALES  0.0667              0.0543 0.0448 0.0000 0.1739
ADMIN&OP/SALES            0.1096 0.0896 0.0741 0.0229 0.2936
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE       
STATE OWNERSHIP BEFORE SIP  0.7548  0.8703   0.2571  0.0054  1.0000  
STATE  OWNERSHIP  AFTER SIP                   0.5432 0.5990 0.1899 0.0040 0.8786
LEGAL PERSON OWNERSHIP BEFORE SIP  0.1460  0.0280   0.2157  0.0000  0.9946  
LEGAL PERSON OWNERSHIP AFTER SIP  0.1023  0.0188   0.1506  0.0000  0.7287  
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix among the Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
PUBLIC ALLOCATION is the fraction of shares (A shares) sold to the general public relative to the total number of shares outstanding at SIP-time.  ROA is EBIT to total assets whereas 
LEVERAGE is the book value of total debt divided by total assets in the year preceding SIP.  DEBT MIX is is the ratio of short-term and long-term bank loans to total debt.  SUBSIDIES 
is the ratio of subsidies scaled by sales in the year before SIP.  MARKET-TO-BOOK is market value of equity (using the offer price) plus book value of debt/book value of total assets.  
FIRM SIZE is measured by the logarithm of total assets pre-SIP and has been deflated.  ADMIN/SALES is the ratio of administrative expenses to total sales.  MARKET RETURN is the 
return on the Shanghai stock exchange in the year before SIP whereas VOLUME is the number of SIPs in the year before SIP scaled by the total number of SIPs.  FOREIGN equals one 
if there was a B or H share issuance before the A share SIP and zero otherwise.  REGULATED equals one if the firm is in regulated industry and zero otherwise. 
 





















PUBLIC ALLOCATION  1.0000   0.1251   0.1625   -0.0270   0.2209   0.1583   -0.5252   0.0601   -0.0291   0.0486   -0.5625   -0.0753  
    (0.0078)                    (0.0005) (0.5669)  (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.2026) (0.5375) (0.3035) (0.0000) (0.1102)
ROA  0.1251   1.0000   -0.0485   -0.1555   -0.0089   0.6621   -0.3239   -0.0520   0.0478   0.0809   -0.2116   -0.0333  
  (0.0078)                      (0.3037) (0.0009)  (0.8510) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2706) (0.3111) (0.0861) (0.0000) (0.4801)
LEVERAGE  0.1625   -0.0485   1.0000   0.2210   -0.0129   -0.0450   0.0310   -0.0106   -0.0581   -0.0038   -0.1771   -0.0831  
  (0.0005)                    (0.3037)   (0.0000)  (0.7845) (0.3402) (0.5117) (0.8226) (0.2181) (0.9362) (0.0002) (0.0780)
DEBT MIX  -0.0270   -0.1555   0.2210   1.0000   0.1011   -0.2579   0.0996   0.1162   -0.0366   -0.0067   0.0482   0.0503  
  (0.5669)                      (0.0009) (0.0000)   (0.0318) (0.0000) (0.0344) (0.0136) (0.4376) (0.8867) (0.3073) (0.2863)
SUBSIDIES  0.2209   -0.0089   -0.0129   0.1011   1.0000   0.1019   -0.0182   0.1291   -0.0065   -0.1246   -0.0814   0.0193  
  (0.0000)                    (0.8510) (0.7845) (0.0318)    (0.0305) (0.6993) (0.0061) (0.8904) (0.0081) (0.0841) (0.6829)
MARKET-TO-BOOK  0.1583   0.6621   -0.0450   -0.2579   0.1019   1.0000   -0.3551   0.0696   0.0456   0.1077   -0.0952   0.0265  
  (0.0007)                    (0.0000) (0.3402) (0.0000)  (0.0305)   (0.0000) (0.1400) (0.3344) (0.0221) (0.0432) (0.5753)
FIRM SIZE  -0.5252   -0.3239   0.0310   0.0996   -0.0182   -0.3551   1.0000   -0.0598   -0.0653   -0.0587   0.4281   0.0259  
  (0.0000)                  (0.0000) (0.5117) (0.0344)  (0.6993) (0.0000)   (0.2051) (0.1661)  (0.2135) (0.0000) (0.5840)
ADMIN/SALES  0.0601   -0.0520   -0.0106   0.1162   0.1291   0.0696   -0.0598   1.0000   -0.1103   -0.0799   0.0852   0.0338  
  (0.2026)                (0.2706) (0.8226) (0.0136)  (0.0061) (0.1400) (0.2051)    (0.0191)  (0.0901) (0.0707) (0.4741)
MARKET RETURN  -0.0291   0.0478   -0.0581   -0.0366   -0.0065   0.0456   -0.0653   -0.1103   1.0000   0.2668   -0.0267   -0.0402  
  (0.5375)                  (0.3111) (0.2181) (0.4376)  (0.8904) (0.3344) (0.1661)  (0.0191)   (0.0000) (0.5721) (0.3949)
VOLUME  0.0486   0.0809   -0.0038   -0.0067   -0.1246   0.1077   -0.0587   -0.0799   0.2668   1.0000   0.0211   0.0593  
  (0.3035)                (0.0861) (0.9362) (0.8867)  (0.0081) (0.0221) (0.2135)  (0.0901) (0.0000)    (0.6551) (0.2091)
FOREIGN  -0.5625   -0.2116   -0.1771   0.0482   -0.0814   -0.0952   0.4281   0.0852   -0.0267   0.0211   1.0000   -0.0580  
  (0.0000)                (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.3073)  (0.0841) (0.0432) (0.0000)  (0.0707) (0.5721)  (0.6551)   (0.2193)
REGULATED  -0.0753   -0.0333   -0.0831   0.0503   0.0193   0.0265   0.0259   0.0338   -0.0402   0.0593   -0.0580   1.0000  




Table 5. Determinants of Public Share Allocation 
The dependent variable PUBLIC ALLOCATION is the fraction of shares (A shares) sold to the general public 
relative to the total number of shares outstanding at SIP-time.  ROA is EBIT to total assets whereas LEVERAGE is 
the book value of total debt divided by total assets in the year preceding SIP.  DEBT MIX is the ratio of short-term 
and long-term bank loans to total debt.  SUBSIDIES is the ratio of subsidies scaled by sales in the year before SIP.  
MARKET-TO-BOOK is market value of equity (using the offer price) plus book value of debt/book value of total 
assets.  FIRM SIZE is measured by the logarithm of total assets pre-SIP and has been deflated.  ADMIN/SALES is 
the ratio of administrative expenses to total sales.  MARKET RETURN is the return on the Shanghai stock exchange 
in the year before SIP whereas VOLUME is the number of SIPs in the year before SIP scaled by the total number of 
SIPs.  FOREIGN equals one if there was a B or H share issuance before the A share SIP and zero otherwise.  
REGULATED equals one if the firm is in regulated industry and zero otherwise.  INDUSTRY DUMMIES control 
for industry-specific determinants of public allocation and are included when there are at least 10 sample firms in 
the corresponding industry. 
 
 
Panel A: regression results on the total sample of 451 firms 







Intercept 1.0739  <.0001 1.0884  <.0001 1.0562    <.0001
ROA -0.1879  0.0155  -0.1617  0.0078     
LEVERAGE  0.0742 0.0028 0.0752 0.0024    0.0789    0.0015 
DEBT MIX  -0.0112  0.4676  -0.0134  0.3713   -0.0139   0.3698 
SUBSIDIES 1.7857  <.0001 1.8218  <.0001 1.8883    <.0001
MARKET-TO-BOOK 0.0033 0.5861  -0.0059    0.2197 
FIRM SIZE  -0.0422  <.0001 -0.0428  <.0001 -0.0417   <.0001
ADMIN/SALES  0.0810 0.2841 0.0831 0.2707    0.0986    0.1929 
MARKET RETURN  -0.0206  0.1214  -0.0206  0.1202   -0.0210   0.1172 
VOLUME  0.1832 0.0143 0.1866 0.0122    0.1838    0.0145 
FOREIGN -0.1370  <.0001 -0.1357  <.0001 -0.1313    <.0001
REGULATED  -0.0548  0.0036  -0.0543  0.0039   -0.0520   0.0059 
INDUSTRY 
DUMMIES 
YES YES YES 
Adjusted R²  48.88%  48.96%  48.29% 
Panel B: regression results on the first subsample of 214 firms (1994-1998) 





Intercept 0.8752  <.0001 0.9605    <.0001
ROA 0.0420  0.5869     
LEVERAGE  0.0589  0.0477   0.0593   0.0457 
DEBT MIX  -0.0097  0.6265   -0.0211   0.3042 
SUBSIDIES  2.1291  0.0551   2.5440   0.0231 
MARKET-TO-BOOK -0.0090    0.1855 
FIRM SIZE  -0.0357  <.0001 -0.0388   <.0001
ADMIN/SALES  0.0944  0.3558   0.0946   0.3530 
MARKET RETURN  -0.0027  0.8875   -0.0061   0.7502 
VOLUME  0.3479  0.0004   0.3874   <.0001
FOREIGN -0.1224  <.0001 -0.1212    <.0001
REGULATED  -0.0641  0.0024   -0.0633   0.0026 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R²  54.92%  55.25%  
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Panel C: regression results on the second subsample of 237 firms (1999-2002) 





Intercept 1.5166  <.0001 1.6065    <.0001
ROA -0.2319  0.0037     
LEVERAGE  0.0310  0.3302   0.0398   0.2014 
DEBT MIX  0.0041  0.8145   -0.0078   0.6521 
SUBSIDIES  0.3101  0.3859   0.3286   0.3496 
MARKET-TO-BOOK -0.0213    <.0001
FIRM SIZE  -0.0620  <.0001 -0.0662   <.0001
ADMIN/SALES  0.0285  0.7309   0.0563   0.4871 
MARKET RETURN  0.0150  0.3526   0.0284   0.0757 
VOLUME  0.1033  0.3052   0.1909   0.0523 
FOREIGN -0.1166  <.0001 -0.1063    <.0001
REGULATED  -0.0252  0.1825   -0.0208   0.2626 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R²  57.05%  58.60%  
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Table 6. Determinants of the Likelihood of Selling a Majority Stake at SIP-time 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if government ownership (direct and indirect via 
state-owned legal person shares) decreases below 50% at SIP-time and zero otherwise. ROA is EBIT to total assets 
whereas LEVERAGE is the book value of total debt divided by total assets in the year preceding SIP.  DEBT MIX is 
the ratio of short-term and long-term bank loans to total debt.  SUBSIDIES is the ratio of subsidies scaled by sales in 
the year before SIP.  MARKET-TO-BOOK is market value of equity (using the offer price) plus book value of 
debt/book value of total assets.  FIRM SIZE is measured by the logarithm of total assets pre-SIP and has been 
deflated.  ADMIN/SALES is the ratio of administrative expenses to total sales.  MARKET RETURN is the return on 
the Shanghai stock exchange in the year before SIP whereas VOLUME is the number of SIPs in the year before SIP 
scaled by the total number of SIPs.  FOREIGN equals one if there was a B or H share issuance before the A share SIP 
and zero otherwise.  REGULATED equals one if the firm is in regulated industry and zero otherwise.  INDUSTRY 
DUMMIES control for industry-specific determinants of public allocation and are included when there are at least 
10 sample firms in the corresponding industry. 
 
Logit Regression Result on 368 firms 
(62 firms have government ownership lower than 50% after their SIP) 
Variable  Parameter estimate  p-value 
Intercept 15.4582  0.0017 
ROA -0.4689  0.8997 
LEVERAGE 1.316  0.2615 
DEBT MIX  -0.612  0.4082 
SUBSIDIES 29.5639  0.0695 
MARKET-TO-BOOK -0.6932  0.0302
FIRM SIZE  -0.8567  0.0004
ADMIN/SALES -1.8812    0.6012 
MARKET RETURN  0.2637   0.6816 
VOLUME 3.2910    0.3573 
FOREIGN 1.9534    0.0062 
REGULATED 0.9893    0.1395 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES  YES 
AIC 340.566 
Likelihood Ratio  -154.283 
Pseudo R²  11.09% 
 UNDERPRICING is the first-day stock return (over offer price) minus the corresponding Shanghai stock market return.  LEVERAGE is the book value of total liabilities divided by 
total assets in the year preceding SIP.  DEBT MIX is the ratio of short-term and long-term bank loans to total debt pre-SIP.  MARKET-TO-BOOK is market value of equity plus book 
value of debt/book value of total assets.  MARKET RETURN is the market return of Shanghai stock exchange in the year preceding SIP.  VOLUME is the number of SIPs in the year 
preceding SIP scaled by total number of SIPs.  LISTINGLAG is the logarithm of the days elapsed between the start of share offering between the actual share listing.   
PREALLOCATION equals 1 if the pre-allocation happened and zero otherwise.  REGULATED equals one if the firm is in regulated industry and zero otherwise.  FOREIGN equals one 
if there was B or H share issuance before A share SIP and zero otherwise. Figures in parentheses are p-values. 
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DEBT MIX  MARKET-T
O-BOOK 
FIRM SIZE  MARKET 
RETURN 






UNDERPRICING  1.0000   -0.0027   0.0532   -0.1076   -0.3660   0.1926   0.1273   0.0614   -0.1680   -0.1318   0.0040  
    (0.9551)                    (0.2599) (0.0223) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0068) (0.1930) (0.0003) (0.0050) (0.9328)
LEVERAGE  -0.0027   1.0000   0.2210   -0.0450   0.0310   -0.0581   -0.0038   -0.1983   -0.0120   -0.1771   -0.0831  
  (0.9551)                      (0.0000) (0.3402) (0.5117) (0.2181) (0.9362) (0.0000) (0.7993) (0.0002) (0.0780)
DEBT MIX  0.0532   0.2210   1.0000   -0.2579   0.0996   -0.0366   -0.0067   -0.0269   0.0277   0.0482   0.0503  
  (0.2599)                    (0.0000)   (0.0000) (0.0344) (0.4376) (0.8867) (0.5688) (0.5572) (0.3073) (0.2863)
MARKET-TO-BOOK  -0.1076   -0.0450   -0.2579   1.0000   -0.3551   0.0456   0.1077   -0.1917   -0.0473   -0.0952   0.0265  
  (0.0223)                    (0.3402) (0.0000)   (0.0000) (0.3344) (0.0221) (0.0000) (0.3158) (0.0432) (0.5753)
FIRM SIZE  -0.3660   0.0310   0.0996   -0.3551   1.0000   -0.0653   -0.0587   0.1818   0.2541   0.4281   0.0259  
  (0.0000)                    (0.5117) (0.0344) (0.0000)   (0.1661) (0.2135) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5840)
MARKET RETURN  0.1926   -0.0581   -0.0366   0.0456   -0.0653   1.0000   0.2668   0.1785   -0.0276   -0.0267   -0.0402  
  (0.0000)                    (0.2181) (0.4376) (0.3344) (0.1661)   (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.5589) (0.5721) (0.3949)
VOLUME   0.1273   -0.0038   -0.0067   0.1077   -0.0587   0.2668   1.0000   -0.2110   -0.2973   0.0211   0.0593  
  (0.0068)                    (0.9362) (0.8867) (0.0221) (0.2135) (0.0000)   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.6551) (0.2091)
LISTINGLAG  0.0614   -0.1983   -0.0269   -0.1917   0.1818   0.1785   -0.2110   1.0000   0.1683   0.1625   -0.0165  
  (0.1930)                    (0.0000) (0.5688) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)   (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.7270)
PREALLOCATION  -0.1680   -0.0120   0.0277   -0.0473   0.2541   -0.0276   -0.2973   0.1683   1.0000   0.0170   -0.0507  
  (0.0003)                    (0.7993) (0.5572) (0.3158) (0.0000) (0.5589) (0.0000) (0.0003)   (0.7194) (0.2830)
FOREIGN  -0.1318   -0.1771   0.0482   -0.0952   0.4281   -0.0267   0.0211   0.1625   0.0170   1.0000   -0.0580  
  (0.0050)                    (0.0002) (0.3073) (0.0432) (0.0000) (0.5721) (0.6551) (0.0005) (0.7194)   (0.2193)
REGULATED  0.0040   -0.0831   0.0503   0.0265   0.0259   -0.0402   0.0593   -0.0165   -0.0507   -0.0580   1.0000  
  (0.9328)                    (0.0780) (0.2863) (0.5753) (0.5840) (0.3949) (0.2091) (0.7270) (0.2830) (0.2193)  
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Table 8. Determinants of Underpricing 
UNDERPRICING is the first-day stock return (over offer price) minus the corresponding Shanghai stock market 
return.  LEVERAGE is the book value of total liabilities divided by total assets in the year preceding SIP.  DEBT 
MIX is the ratio of short-term and long-term bank loans to total debt pre-SIP.  MARKET-TO-BOOK is market value 
of equity plus book value of debt/book value of total assets.  FIRM SIZE is the logarithm of total assets in the year 
preceding SIP and has been deflated.  MARKET RETURN is the market return of Shanghai stock exchange in the 
year preceding SIP.  VOLUME is the number of SIPs in the year preceding SIP scaled by total number of SIPs.  
LISTINGLAG is the logarithm of the number of days elapsed between the start of share offering between the actual 
share listing.  PREALLOCATION equals 1 if the pre-allocation happened and zero otherwise.  REGULATED 
equals one if the firm is in regulated industry and zero otherwise.  FOREIGN equals one if there was B or H share 
issuance before A share SIP and zero otherwise.  INDUSTRY DUMMIES control for industry-specific determinants 
of underpricing and are included when there are at least 10 sample firms in the corresponding industry. 
 
Panel A: regression results on the total sample of 451 firms 
Variable Parameter  estimate  p-value 
INTERCEPT 8.9123  <.0001
LEVERAGE -0.0358  0.8871 
DEBT MIX  0.1127  0.4592 
MARKET-TO-BOOK -0.3001  <.0001
FIRM SIZE  -0.3831  <.0001
MARKET RETURN  0.3569  0.0092 
VOLUME 1.5003  0.0617 
LISTINGLAG 0.1127  0.0611 
PREALLOCATION -0.0989  0.3165 
FOREIGN -0.0007  0.9960 
REGULATED -0.0379  0.8401 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES  YES 
Adjusted R²                                               28.60 % 
Panel B: regression results on the first subsample of 214 firms (1994-1998) 
Variable Parameter  estimate  p-value 
INTERCEPT 6.2256  <.0001
LEVERAGE 0.3667  0.2961 
DEBT MIX  0.1407  0.5400 
MARKET-TO-BOOK -0.1822  0.0242 
FIRM SIZE  -0.3300  <.0001
MARKET RETURN  0.6306  0.0040 
VOLUME 2.7243  0.0164 
LISTINGLAG 0.3714  <.0001
PREALLOCATION -0.0875  0.6703 
FOREIGN 0.1631  0.3843 
REGULATED 0.0462  0.8449 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES  YES 
Adjusted R²                                               29.43 %  
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Panel C: regression results on the second subsample of 237 firms (1999-2002) 
INTERCEPT 13.8132  <.0001
LEVERAGE -0.2616  0.4256 
DEBT MIX  0.2269  0.2079 
MARKET-TO-BOOK -0.4254  <.0001
FIRM SIZE  -0.5715  <.0001
MARKET RETURN  0.6907  0.0002 
VOLUME 2.2733  0.0507 
LISTINGLAG -0.1175  0.1771 
PREALLOCATION -0.1187  0.3050 
FOREIGN 0.0558  0.7736 
REGULATED -0.2487  0.2049 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES  YES 
Adjusted R²                                               45.29%  
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Table 9. Determinants of Public Share Allocation and Underpricing – 3SLS Model 
UNDERPRICING is the first-day stock return (over offer price) minus the corresponding Shanghai stock market 
return.  PUBLIC ALLOCATION is the fraction of shares (A shares) sold to the general public relative to the total 
number of shares outstanding at SIP-time. ROA is EBIT to total assets whereas LEVERAGE is the book value of 
total debt divided by total assets in the year preceding SIP.  DEBT MIX is the ratio of short-term and long-term bank 
loans to total debt.  SUBSIDIES is the ratio of subsidies scaled by sales in the year before SIP.   
MARKET-TO-BOOK is market value of equity (using the offer price) plus book value of debt/book value of total 
assets. FIRM SIZE is measured by the logarithm of total assets pre-SIP and has been deflated.  ADMIN/SALES is 
the ratio of administrative expenses to total sales. MARKET RETURN is the market return of Shanghai stock 
exchange in the year preceding SIP. VOLUME is the number of SIPs in the year preceding SIP scaled by total 
number of SIPs.  LISTINGLAG is the logarithm of the number of days elapsed between the start of share offering 
and the actual share listing.  PREALLOCATION equals 1 if the pre-allocation happened and zero otherwise.  
REGULATED equals one if the firm is in regulated industry and zero otherwise.  FOREIGN equals one if there was 
B or H share issuance before A share SIP and zero otherwise.  INDUSTRY DUMMIES control for industry-specific 
determinants of public allocation and underpricing, and are included when there are at least 10 sample firms in the 
corresponding industry. 
 
Dependent Variable: PUBLIC ALLOCATION  Dependent Variable: UNDERPRICING 
Variable  Paramete
r estimate 
p-value  Variable  Paramete
r estimate 
p-value 
INTERCEPT 1.9202  0.0012  INTERCEPT 0.6658    0.7980 
UNDERPRICING -0.0878  0.1415  PUBLIC 
ALLOCATION 
7.4149   0.0004 
ROA -0.3342  0.0185     
LEVERAGE 0.0625  0.0616  LEVERAGE  -0.5247    0.1221 
DEBT MIX  -0.0091  0.6554  DEBT MIX  0.1286   0.4919 
SUBSIDIES 2.9433  0.0018     
MARKET-TO-BOOK -0.0195 0.2650  MARKET-TO-BOOK -0.2679    <.0001
FIRM SIZE  -0.0769  0.0017  FIRM SIZE  -0.0695   0.5069 
ADMIN/SALES 0.0894  0.3665     
MARKET RETURN  0.0148  0.6178  MARKET RETURN  0.4806   0.0052 
VOLUME 0.3359  0.0188  VOLUME 0.5470    0.5914 
 LISTINGLAG  0.1826    0.0172 
 PREALLOCATION  -0.2258    0.0732 
FOREIGN -0.1337  <.0001 FOREIGN 0.9802    0.0027 







2 34.88% Adjusted  R
2 21.46% 
 